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Abstract: This paper addresses the process aspect of capability development in connection 
with the debate in the capability approach over the relationship between individual and 
collective capabilities by combining Sen’s ‘privateness’ interpretation of different aspects of 
the self and Granovetter’s social embeddedness framework.  It interprets Sen’s 
commitment aspect of the self in collective intentionality terms, uses this to explain his 
view of ‘identification with’ social groups, and then uses social identity theory’s distinction 
between relational and categorical social group identities to explain a general relationship 
between individual and collective capabilities.  The paper applies this analysis to three 
broad domains of social embeddedness – market activity, public deliberation, and 
community participation – in order to explain the process aspect of capability 
development in terms of how each domain balances individual and collective capabilities.   
Keywords: Sen, process aspect, Granovetter, collective capabilities, self, collective 
intentions, social identity 
 
Resumen: En este trabajo se aborda el aspecto procesual del proceso de desarrollo de 
capacidades en relación con el debate del enfoque capacidades sobre la relación entre las 
capacidades individuales y colectivas, mediante la combinación entre la interpretación de 
Sen de la privacidad de los distintos aspectos/facetas del “yo” y el marco de arraigo social 
de Granovetter’s. Este artículo interpreta el aspecto del compromiso del “yo” planteado por 
Sen, en términos de intencionalidad colectiva, usa esto para explicar su mirada sobre la 
identificación con grupos sociales, y luego usa la distinción que hace la teoría de la 
identidad social entre capacidades del grupo social relacionales y categóricas para explicar 
una relación general entre capacidades individuales y colectivas. Se aplica este análisis a 
tres amplios dominios de arraigo social: la actividad del mercado, la deliberación pública y 
la participación de la comunidad- para explicar el proceso de desarrollo de capacidades en 
términos de cómo cada dominio armoniza las capacidades individuales y colectivas. 
Palabras clave: Sen, aspecto procesal, Granovetter, capacidades colectivas, yo, 
intenciones colectivas, identidad social. 
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1.  Introduction: Agency and capabilities 
Agency is addressed in the capability approach through attention to the 
process aspect of capability development.  Sen treats poverty as capability 
deprivation, and argues that the alleviation of poverty –an expansion of 
people’s capabilities and functionings – has two distinct aspects: an 
opportunity aspect and a process aspect (Sen 1999a, p. 17; also Sen 2002, p. 
585).  The opportunity aspect concerns what things people are able to 
achieve that they value, “given their personal and social circumstances.”  The 
question is: what opportunities do people have?  The process aspect 
concerns their freedom of choice and ability to act as agents in regard to 
their capabilities, which can be constrained “through inadequate processes 
(such as the violation of voting or other political or civil rights).”   The 
question here is how successfully can people act on their capabilities?  Much 
work on the capability approach has been devoted to the opportunity aspect, 
and to how people’s capability sets can be expanded.  Less attention has 
been devoted to the process aspect, and to how people’s freedom of choice 
and agency can be strengthened.  Likely this is partly due to the difficulties 
associated with explaining the nature of agency and the determinants of 
freedom.  There are two difficulties in particular.  First, there are many 
things involved in how social processes work, and it is not easy to say how 
they contribute to or limit freedom of choice and agency.  Second, saying 
what agency is in and of itself involves many difficult issues concerning the 
nature of action and what it means to have an ability to act. 
This paper’s focus is the process aspect of capability development, framed in 
terms of these two difficulties.  It assumes that they need to be addressed 
together in that the nature of agency and people’s ability to act depends on 
the character of the space in which people act.  The paper also assumes that 
this space can be seen as broadly comprised of three relatively distinct 
domains: market activity, public deliberation, and community participation 
(Leßmann 2011).  Following Granovetter (1985), these domains are 
distinguished in terms of their ‘social embeddedness’ or according to the 
extent to which they each determine the nature of interaction between 
individuals and social structures.  Granovetter’s own approach is a little 
different.  He argues that economics has an ‘undersocialized’ conception of 
this interaction, placing greater weight on individuals and less on social 
structures, whereas sociology has an ‘oversocialized’ conception of it, placing 
greater weight on social structures and less on individuals.  The argument of 
this paper is not about economics and sociology but about how these three 
domains each constitute the space determining freedom of choice and the 
nature of agency.  Setting aside the pejorative meanings he attaches to these 
terms, it treats the market as an undersocialized domain, community 
participation as an oversocialized domain, and public deliberation as a 
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mixture of both.  Our understanding of the process aspect of capability 
development, then, can be developed in a sequential manner by first 
explaining individuals’ ability to act according to their social embeddedness 
in each of these domains, and by second focusing on individuals’ different 
locations across these domains. 
To take the first step one needs to say something about how interaction 
between individuals and social structures is understood in the capability 
approach.  This can be usefully framed by the debate over individual and 
collective capabilities.  While there is disagreement in the capability 
literature over what collective capabilities are and over how individual and 
collective capabilities relate to one another, this paper lays out a way of 
understanding the latter and the relation between the two that appears 
consistent with Sen’s thinking.  It then applies the Granovetter framework to 
say how markets, democracy, and community differ in degrees of social 
embeddedness by interpreting this as a matter of how they differently 
balance individual and collective capabilities.  Sen (1985) has laid the 
groundwork for this strategy in his ‘privateness’ interpretation of different 
aspects of the self.  Essentially we can associate his different aspects of the 
self with these three social domains.  The paper then argues that when we 
come to the most socially embedding domain, community, where collective 
capabilities are especially important, Sen’s ‘fourth’ aspect of the self, as 
associated with being able to make commitments to others becomes 
especially relevant.  Following Davis (2007), the individual-social structure 
relation that underlies the relation between individual and collective 
capabilities is explained in terms of individuals forming shared or collective 
intentions with respect to social groups.  
Thus the paper aims to explain agency and the process aspect of capability 
development by saying what ‘privateness’ and social embeddedness tell us 
about individual and collective capabilities.  Section 2 begins by reviewing 
current thinking in the capability approach about individual and collective 
capabilities, emphasizing Sen’s position on the matter.  Section 3 discusses 
his ‘privateness’ interpretation of four different aspects of the self, and 
reviews how he links his fourth commitment aspect of the self, identity, and 
social groups.  Section 4 explains Sen’s fourth commitment aspect of the self 
in terms the ability people have for form collective intentions, and 
distinguishes his particular conception of social groups.  Section 5 returns to 
individual and collective capabilities, and offers an interpretation of the 
latter and the relation between the two derived from Sen’s ‘privateness’ 
framework when combined with collective intentions.  The discussion draws 
on social identity theory’s distinction between relational and categorical 
social identities to explain two ways in which people identify with social 
groups.  Section 6 uses this account of individual and collective capabilities 
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and Granovetter’s social embeddedness framework to differentiate three 
broad domains of social interaction: market activity, public deliberation, and 
community participation.  It argues that the process aspect of capability 
development needs to be understood differently in each domain.  Section 8 
closes with a discussion of the process aspect of capability development in 
regard to the relationship between individual and collective capabilities. 
 
2.  Individual and collective capabilities 
Much of the interest in the capability approach in the idea of collective 
capabilities as a distinct kind of capability is associated with the issue of how 
social interaction is relevant to capability development.1  Thus, in an 
exchange with Sen, Evans first states that “some of the greatest intrinsic 
satisfactions in life arguably come from social interaction with others who 
share our interests and values,” and then goes on to say that the kind of 
capability this involves is “a collective rather than an individual capability” 
(Evans 2002, p. 56).  Further, he associates collective capabilities with what 
he terms organized collectivities – he lists as examples unions, political 
parties, village councils, and women’s groups – which are understood to 
engage in collective action.  Organized collectivities, that is, are social 
groups, so Evans’ position is effectively that collective capabilities are social 
group capabilities.  While he allows that the capabilities of organized 
collectivities or social groups depend in important ways on their members’ 
individual capabilities, his emphasis on collective action puts this in the 
background.  Collective capabilities are thus basically a distinct kind of 
capability.  In Evans’ mind this means that further opportunities for 
explaining capability development have gone unexploited.  “For those 
already sufficiently privileged to enjoy a full range of capabilities, collective 
action may seem superfluous to capability, but for the less privileged 
attaining development as freedom requires collective action” (Evans 2002, p. 
56).  Developing collective capabilities is consequently complementary to 
developing individual capabilities, and is also particularly important for 
Evans at earlier stages of a society’s capability development.   
In reply, Sen agrees with Evans’ statement that “some of the greatest 
intrinsic satisfactions in life arguably come from social interaction with 
others who share our interests and values” (Evans 2002, p. 56; Sen 2002, p. 
85), but denies that collective capabilities in Evan’s social group sense are 
relevant to the capability approach.  The reason is that collective capabilities 
in this sense – which Sen allows involves a very real kind of capability – do 
                                                             
1 See Ballet et al. (2007), De Herdt and Abega (2007), Ibrahim (2007), and Uyan-Semerci (2007).  I 
discuss the exchange between Evans (2002) and Sen (2002) in order to bring out Sen’s influential 
view of the matter. 
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not have any specific connection to individual capabilities, and he 
accordingly recommends that we rather refer to “socially dependent 
individual capabilities” when we want to emphasize the effects of social 
interaction on individual capability development. 
The intrinsic satisfactions that occur in a life must occur in an individual’s 
life, but in terms of causal connections, they depend on social interactions 
with others.  The socially dependent individual capabilities have to be 
distinguished from what are genuinely ‘collective capabilities,’ such as the 
capability of a world nuclear power to kill the entire population of the world 
through nuclear bombing ….  Similarly, the capability of Hutu activists to 
decimate the Tutsis is a collective capability in the genuinely integrated 
sense, since the ability to do this is not a part of any individual Hutu’s life.  
There could also be more positive – more admirable – collective capabilities, 
such as the capability of humanity as a whole … to cut child mortality 
drastically. (Sen 2002b, p. 85).  
Collective action such as is associated with social groups such as Hutu 
activists creates “a collective capability in the genuinely integrated sense,” 
but this means that it cannot be “a part of any individual Hutu’s life.”  Such 
capabilities are thus altogether removed from the “intrinsic satisfactions” 
associated with people being able to exercise their individual capabilities, 
and are accordingly irrelevant to the capability approach.  In effect, then, 
Evans’ tying collective capabilities to social groups, which on anyone’s social 
ontology do not experience satisfactions of any kind, severs their connection 
to the capability approach.   
Can Evans’ and Sen’s positions be reconciled?  They agree that collective 
capabilities exist, and agree that they derive from social interaction.  Their 
positions also both accommodate Granovetter’s embeddedness framework 
in which social structures influence individuals and individuals influence 
social structures.  Sen’s “socially dependent individual capabilities” 
expression exactly captures the idea that social structures influence 
individuals, and Evans states that “[i]ndividual capabilities depend on 
collective capabilities” (Evans 2002, p. 56).  Both presumably also agree that 
collective capabilities at least implicitly depend on individual capabilities, so 
for both individuals also influence social structures.   
Where they disagree is over whether “a collective capability in the genuinely 
integrated sense,” as Sen characterizes Evans’ social group organized 
collectivities idea, has any specific connection to individual capabilities in 
terms of the “intrinsic satisfactions” people derive from exercising individual 
capabilities.  Put in terms of Granovetter’s framework, the barrier to linking 
collective capabilities to individual capabilities in terms of how each 
influences the other lies in the absence of a way of explaining how social 
groups, seen as highly integrated, influence and are influenced by 
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individuals on the level of “intrinsic satisfactions.”  But social groups are of 
course a part of social structure.  So it seems that if both Evans and Sen’s 
views are roughly consonant with Granovetter’s framework, in principle it 
should be possible to extend this common ground to the relationship 
between individuals and social groups as a way of explaining the relationship 
between individual and collective capabilities. 
Sen, in fact, has discussed the relationship between individuals and social 
groups in connection with the concept of social identity (Sen 1985, 1999b, 
2006).  The next section reviews his basis for these views in the agency 
analysis he develops for the person in his ‘privateness’ interpretation of 
different aspects of the self.  Central to this account is how he redevelops his 
original understanding of the concept of commitment in terms of non-self-
regardingness and self-assessment. The section following the next one then 
goes on to discuss how Sen applies this concept of commitment in his 
identity account of individuals’ social group affiliations, and further develops 
his suggestion that the means by which people make such commitments is 
their ability to form collective intentions.   
 
3.  Sen’s ‘privateness’ interpretation of the different aspects of the self  
Sen distinguishes three aspects of the self, concepts of the person, or ways in 
which individuals act as agents in standard economic theory (where they are 
typically not clearly distinguished), and then adds his fourth sense 
associated with his concept of commitment.  The three aspects we find in 
standard economics are: 
Self-centered welfare: A person’s welfare depends only on her own 
consumption and other features of the richness of her life (without 
any sympathy or antipathy toward others, and without any procedural 
concern). 
 
Self-welfare goal:  A person’s only goal is to maximize her own welfare. 
 
Self-goal choice: A person’s choices must be based entirely on the 
pursuit of her own goals (Sen 2002a, pp. 33-4).2 
 
Note two things about this taxonomy.  First, Sen’s three types of ‘privateness’ 
can be ranked in terms of decreasing self-regardingness or increasing other-
regardingness.  Self-centered welfare concerns only the individual’s own 
satisfaction, self-welfare goal allows other individuals’ satisfactions to enter 
into an individual’s satisfaction through sympathy or antipathy, and self-goal 
                                                             
2 See Sen (1985) for a slightly different statement of these aspects. 
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choice allows for non-welfarist goals of all kinds (for example, the pursuit of 
social justice).  Second, this decreasing self-regardingness is coupled with a 
“discipline of self-assessment” (Sen 2002a, p. 33) whose exercise increasingly 
mediates the individual’s own concerns by concerns that reach beyond the 
individual.  Only self-centered welfare is largely independent of such 
considerations; individuals are only concerned with themselves, and their 
self-assessment is limited solely to what affects their own lives.  But with 
self-welfare goal individuals’ self-assessment includes concern for others’ 
welfare, and with self-goal choice individuals’ self-assessment includes 
concerns that transcend their welfare altogether.  That is, when they judge 
what their goals are, they find that their goals include the goals of others.  
Thus, across the three forms of ‘privateness’ individuals’ choices are both 
decreasingly self-regarding and their “discipline of self-assessment” depends 
increasingly upon attention to others.  
 
On this foundation, Sen re-explains his “Rational Fools” (Sen 1977) concept 
of commitment.  Originally his emphasis rested primarily on how sympathy 
and commitment were different, and this meant that commitment had to be 
defined relative to welfare.  Sympathy is always welfare increasing, but acts 
of commitment can produce “a lower level of personal welfare,” and thus 
drive “a wedge between personal choice and personal welfare” (Sen 1977, p. 
329).  But in his ‘privateness’ framework commitment follows after non-
welfarist self-goal choice, not after self-welfare goal, and so occupies a 
further step away from welfare and self-regardingness concerns.  Sen also 
associates commitment with what he comes to calls “the fourth aspect of the 
self” (Sen 2002a, p. 36) and frames this all in terms of his new emphasis on 
the individual’s “discipline of self-assessment.”  Indeed, as falling altogether 
outside standard economic theory’s three aspects of the self, commitment 
has little to do with how choice and the person are understood in standard 
welfare economics.  Sen emphasizes this in characterizing the self-
assessment a person engages in when forming commitments in terms of 
“reasoning and self-scrutiny” (Sen 2002a, p. 36), an ability that altogether 
lacks meaning in standard economics’ conception of choice. 
 
A person is not only an entity that can enjoy one’s own consumption, 
experience, and appreciate one’s welfare, and have one’s goals, but also an 
entity that can examine one’s values and objectives and choose in the light 
of those values and objectives (Sen 2002a, p. 36). 
 
Standard theory, of course operates exclusively with an instrumental reason 
understanding of choice as always motivated by payoffs, and this view of 
rationality underlies the first three aspects of the self above.  In contrast, the 
reasons-based view of rationality that Sen expresses above does not require 
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that choices be motivated by payoffs (though they can be3), and this marks 
off his fourth sense of the person as qualitatively different from the first 
three aspects.  This difference is implicit in “Rational Fools” but Sen’s 
reference to “reasoning and self-scrutiny” – which occurs repeatedly in his 
subsequent writings on capabilities – signals a change in course. 
 
Note also then, that individuals who are able to reflect upon their values and 
objectives must have some sense of what their own identities involve.  In 
effect, self-scrutiny means they are able to stand back from themselves to 
assess who they are, and also, it follows, an ability to see how their identities 
might be affected by the choices they make.  Sen’s fourth aspect of the self, 
then, provides a specific conception of individual identity – or personal 
identity – which involves being able to reflexively reach beyond one’s own 
concerns in making commitments to others.  It is an important idea that 
personal identity (and thus autonomy) is explained in terms of one’s 
relationships to others, not in some sort of Homo economicus way in terms 
of one’s own characteristics alone.  But who are these ‘others’ to whom 
people make commitments?  Of course the commitments a person makes to 
others can range from those made to particular people (such as a promise to 
a friend) to people’s ‘causes’ (such as peace or the environment).  But Sen 
has an intermediate target in mind when he associates commitments and 
identity, namely social groups:  
 
We all have many identities, and being “just me” is not the only way we see 
ourselves.  Community, nationality, race, sex, union membership, the 
fellowship of oligopolists, revolutionary solidarity, and so on, all provide 
identities that can be, depending on the context, crucial to our view of 
ourselves, and thus to the way we view our welfare, goals, or behavioral 
obligations (Sen 2002a, p. 215). 
 
Consequently, our individual personal identities somehow involve “many 
identities,” which derive from the different social groups to which we may 
simultaneously belong, each of which “provide identities that can be, 
depending on the context, crucial to our view of ourselves.” We may 
characterize these commitments as identity commitments.  But how exactly 
do people’s identity commitments come about?  And if commitment is 
associated with a high degree on non-self-regardingness, how are identity 
commitments compatible with a person still being a single individual and 
having a personal identity?  To answer these questions, the following section 
discusses Sen’s suggestion that we form commitments through our ability to 
                                                             
3 The difference between a reasons-based, non-instrumental rationality and instrumental rationality 
in this regard is that for the former reasons dictate choices, not payoffs, whereas for the latter 
payoffs dictate choices, and in effect determine what is rational.  For a reasons-based account of 
commitment close to Sen’s original treatment of commitment, see Searle (2001, pp. 167ff). 
Filosofía de la Economía, 2015, Vol. 4, pp. 5-24 
13 
 
express collective intentions toward others, and then argues that collective 
intentions both explain social group identity commitments and are also 
personal identity-preserving. 
 
 
4.  Sen on commitment, social groups, and identity:  the collective 
intentions view 
How does one have an identity as a member of a social group?  In social 
psychology’s social identity theory4 the identities that social groups provide 
us – our social group identities – are the product of our identifying with 
those groups by seeing ourselves as members of them.  This ‘identification 
with’ idea is what Sen refers to when he speaks of our association with social 
groups in terms of non-self-regarding commitments we make to them.  But 
there is an ambiguity in the ‘identification with’ idea that permits two 
interpretations.  First, since the relationship between individuals and social 
groups in the simplest sense is explained as membership, individuals who 
form commitments to social groups and identify with them could be said to 
fully replace their identities as independent individuals by their identities as 
group members.  In this strong sense of ‘identification with’ they are defined 
entirely by their membership status, and are indistinguishable from all other 
social group members.  However, this is clearly not Sen’s sense of 
‘identification with’ as shown by his rejection of Evans’ idea of “a collective 
capability in the genuinely integrated sense” and preference for the socially 
dependent individual capabilities idea.  So while commitment diminishes 
one’s self-regardingness, it somehow modifies rather than eliminates one’s 
status as an independent individual.5 
 
Second, then, the ‘identification with’ idea can also be understood to 
combine membership in a social group with remaining an independent 
individual.  Sen suggests one way of understanding this in his statement 
above that we have “many identities” associated with having multiple social 
group memberships.  Basically, if one is a member of multiple social groups, 
one cannot be reduced to being a member of a single social group.  In effect, 
one is the ‘common denominator’ of all one’s social group memberships.  It 
could of course be the case that a person who is a member of many social 
groups has no common denominator, and fragments into many 
memberships, but this is not Sen’s view either.  He is emphatic elsewhere 
when he speaks about identity (Sen 1999b, 2006) that people have the ability 
                                                             
4 There are different social identity approaches.  See Hogg et al. (1995) for an overview. 
5 One can nonetheless employ this strong sense of ‘identification with’ and speak of ‘individual’ 
capabilities as strictly member capabilities by explaining “group capabilities” in terms of their 
members’ “average capabilities” (Stewart 2005).  The idea of “group capabilities” is similar to but 
still quite different from Evans’ collective capabilities, as associated with collective action. 
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to deny social group claims made upon them by evaluating and reasoning 
about their values and objectives – as reflected in the passage above (Sen 
2002a, p. 36).  This implies that individuals retain some sort of autonomy, 
and are not reducible to sets of social group memberships. 
 
How, then, does Sen capture the second sense of the ‘identification with’ 
idea?  Here he hints at the importance of collective intentions and our use of 
first person plural speech.  
 
The nature of our language often underlines the forces of our wider identity.  “We” 
demand things; “our” actions reflect “our” concerns; “we” protest at injustice done 
to “us.”  This is, of course, the language of social intercourse and politics, but it is 
difficult to believe that it represents nothing other than a verbal form, and in 
particular no sense of identity (Sen 2002a, p. 215; also Sen 2002a, p. 41). 
 
Sen does not explicitly connect our ability to express collective intentions 
and use ‘we’ speech to how individuals identify with social groups, but that 
is clearly the context at hand.  Nor does he explain just how collective 
intentions allow us to simultaneously identify ourselves as members of social 
groups and yet remain at least relatively independent individuals.  But let us 
consider what such speech involves, paying particular attention to the 
concept of commitment as Sen understands it. 
 
Collective intentions expressed in ‘we’ speech and personal intentions 
expressed in first person singular ‘I’ speech differ significantly in terms of 
their respective conditions of success as speech acts.  To be a successful act 
of communication, the expression of an intention in first person singular ‘I’ 
speech needs to be understandable but has limited uptake requirements for 
those to whom it is expressed.  Whether they agree or disagree with the 
intention expressed is largely immaterial to its expression.  In contrast, the 
expression of a collective intention using ‘we’ speech not only needs to be 
understandable but also needs to meet conditions of acceptance for those to 
whom it is expressed.  If someone says ‘we’ and those to whom it is said deny 
what is expressed applies to them, then that collective intention has failed.  
We may thus say that collective intentions are inherently relational in 
nature, while personal intentions are basically autonomous in nature.6 
 
Notice also then, that the burden of satisfying the condition of acceptance 
for a collective intention rests on the person expressing that intention, not 
on those to whom it is expressed.  Thus, when using ‘we’ language, one must 
impose upon oneself the requirement that one’s statement be acceptable,7 
and in imposing that burden upon oneself one individualizes oneself relative 
                                                             
6
 See Uyan-Semerci (2007) on the relational nature of ‘we’ speech. 
7 If that statement is not frivolous, deceptive, or involves some sort of authoritarian ‘royal’ we. 
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to the audience addressed.  That is, obligating oneself – self-obligation – 
through the expression of a collective intention secures the individual’s 
autonomy in relation to those to whom it is expressed.  This analysis can 
then be applied to explain how individuals identify with social groups in an 
individual identity-preserving way.  If, as Sen suggests, one identifies with a 
social group by making a commitment to it expressed in collective intention 
terms, one achieves both membership in that group and yet also 
individualizes oneself relative to that group.8   
 
Sen associates his fourth sense of the self – the “reasoning and self-scrutiny” 
sense of the self – with the ability to form commitments to others (not only 
social groups).  It is this particular ability, inherent in our very nature and 
thus not an acquired capability, which ultimately provides the basis for our 
relative autonomy as socially embedded individuals.  Let us, then, apply this 
understanding to explain the relationship between individual and collective 
capabilities. 
 
 
5.  Individual and collective capabilities revisited 
Evans contrasts individual and collective capabilities, and explains the latter 
as the product of collective action carried out by social groups.  Sen sees this 
as “a collective capability in the genuinely integrated sense,” and denies its 
relevance to the capability approach.  In light of the discussion above, it 
seems fair to say that Evans employs the first sense of the social group 
‘identification with’ idea, where individuals are defined entirely by their 
membership status, are indistinguishable from all other social group 
members, and at least when acting as group members do not function as 
relatively independent individuals.  In contrast, we saw that Sen employs the 
second sense of the ‘identification with’ idea, which when framed in 
collective intentionality terms allows us to explain people simultaneously as 
social group members and as relatively independent individuals.  Thus Sen 
has a different understanding of social groups, namely, social groups which 
are not fully integrated in Evans’ sense.  
We also saw that Sen agrees with Evans that individual capabilities depend 
on people’s social interactions, and so characterizes them as “socially 
dependent individual capabilities.” But since he also sees social groups as 
important to people, and sees individuals’ commitments to them as being 
important to those groups, it seems that he also, at least implicitly, operates 
with a parallel notion of ‘individually dependent collective capabilities,’ 
                                                             
8 Like Ballet et al. (2007), the argument here regarding self-obligation draws on a reasons-based 
deontological reasoning, but is different in deriving this from collective rather than personal 
intentions. 
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which would refer to the capabilities that (not fully integrated) social groups 
have as a consequence of individuals making commitments to them.  That is, 
if we go beyond Evan’s view of social groups with its strong individual 
capabilities-collective capabilities dichotomy, and use Granovetter’s 
framework in which individuals and social structures are mutually 
influencing, then we not only need a way of talking about how individual 
capabilities are influenced by social groups, but also need a way of talking 
about how individuals influence what social groups in Sen’s sense can 
achieve.  I suggest that when we talk about what social groups in this not 
fully integrated sense can achieve, we are talking about social group 
collective capabilities in a way that is consistent with Sen’s thinking.  The 
advantages of such a concept over the collective capabilities concept that 
Evans employs is that it escapes his strong individual capabilities-collective 
capabilities dichotomy, and also provides us a way of thinking about 
“socially dependent individual capabilities” and ‘individually dependent 
collective capabilities’ in relation to one another.  In particular, this provides 
us a further way of understanding the idea of “socially dependent individual 
capabilities” as not just the product of how people’s social interactions 
influence their capabilities, but as also, at one remove, the product of 
individuals’ influence on their social interactions in connection with their 
participation in social groups. 
Social group collective capabilities, then, have a dual relation to people’s 
individual capabilities in that they result from the commitments people 
make to social groups (are ‘individually dependent’), and in turn impact 
people’s individual capabilities (which are “socially dependent”).  This is 
exactly the opposite of Evans’ view, since here social group collective 
capabilities have no status apart from this two-sided relationship with 
individual capabilities.  Note, however, that the analysis is not symmetric 
with respect to individual capabilities, since they have a looser relation to 
social group capabilities.  Some individual capabilities are indeed directly 
related to individuals’ activities in social groups; they might be termed social 
group ‘participation’ capabilities, such as teamwork capabilities and shared 
deliberation capabilities.  But other individual capabilities are “socially 
dependent” in virtue of the many other non-social group ways in which 
social interaction influences individual capabilities. That is, individual 
capabilities do not have a dual relation to social group collective capabilities. 
This reflects how individuals’ relative autonomy is foundational in the 
capability approach.   
But how exactly does this set of mutual influences between social groups 
and individuals operate?  If we are to be confident we are working with a 
concept of collective capabilities not vulnerable to Sen’s criticism of fully 
integrated groups, we need to show how commitment not only produces 
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individuals’ social identification with groups, but also how social groups as a 
product of such commitments generate ‘individually dependent collective 
capabilities.’ 
Needless to say, explaining individual-social group relationships in a 
concrete manner is a large task, and not only for the capability approach.  
But we can take a clue from Sen about how to begin by focusing on getting 
past the idea of a social group as fully integrated, where the meaning of that 
is that membership does not distinguish one person from the next.  This 
idea of a social group is useful for explanations of collective action per se, but 
everyone knows (including Evans of course) that generally social groups are 
internally differentiated in terms of roles and responsibilities and that their 
members are distinguishable from one another in a variety of ways.  In 
connection with Sen’s fourth aspect of the self, this means that 
commitments to social groups are typically made to groups but with an 
understanding of the particular role and responsibility relationships the 
person making that commitment has to the group.  Psychology’s social 
identity theory captures this idea nicely in distinguishing two ways in which 
people socially identify with groups.  They do so through their relational 
social identities, which are “(i) those that derive from interpersonal 
relationships and interdependence with specific others,” and also through 
their categorical social identities, which are “(ii) those that derive from 
membership in larger, more impersonal collectives or social categories” 
(Brewer and Gardner 1996).  Relational social identities are thus associated 
with a person’s roles and responsibilities in the group, and categorical social 
identities are associated with a person’s attachment to the group as a whole.  
The commitments people make to social groups include both aspects.  Let us 
then consider capability development from both perspectives.  
First, how people’s commitments to social groups generate “socially 
dependent individual capabilities” is a matter of how their relational social 
identities enable them to develop their individual capabilities in the roles 
they occupy in social groups.  These roles by themselves individualize them, 
but on the collective intentionality analysis above their commitments to 
others in their role relationships also enable people to individualize 
themselves relative to others.  Indeed, roles are typically interlocking and 
consequently combine people with one another in partnerships and teams.  
In these within-group social interactions people develop their capabilities, 
not just in terms of what they can be and do, but in terms of what they can 
be and do in cooperation with others who are similarly developing their 
capabilities.9  This social group interpretation of “socially dependent 
                                                             
9 An excellent illustration of this is the account of families as social groups where mother-child role 
relationships create ‘relational capabilities’ (Uyan-Semerci 2007).  Her analysis is also based on ‘we’ 
speech. 
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individual capabilities” takes us beyond the basic idea that individual 
capability development occurs in a broad undifferentiated social space in 
which social forces generally influence capability development, because here 
we can tie the mechanism by which individual capabilities are developed to 
specific role sites of social interaction.  Clearly this is important for 
understanding the process aspect of capability development, to which I 
return below. 
Second, how individuals’ commitments to social groups – where they 
identify with them categorically – generate ‘individually dependent 
collective capabilities’ is a matter of how these commitments make it 
possible for people to achieve things in groups not possible when acting as 
unorganized collections of individuals.  Here we are close to Evans’ 
collective action view, though in this case behind collective action and 
supporting it are people’s within-group relational social identities which 
structure the social group’s internal organization and provides it 
cohesiveness.  That is, individuals’ relational social identification and 
categorical social identification with a given social group go hand in hand.  
Clearly there are many different ways in which these two types of 
identification interact – and not always smoothly.  The breakdown of a role 
relationship might precipitate an individual’s abandonment of a group.  Or 
conversely attachment to a group might facilitate a role opportunity. 
As an illustration, consider the tensions that sometimes arise between 
women’s individual capability development and their gender social 
identities.10  In many societies, women are pressed to maintain traditional 
social roles in families and communities on the grounds that this is what 
‘women’ should be and do.  They are thus expected, in effect, to make a 
commitment to their categorical social identities as women by adopting 
traditional role relational social identities. However, should they reject these 
role identities they sometimes find themselves in the position of also 
rejecting their categorical identities as ‘women,’ at least in the traditional 
interpretations of those identities that prevail in many societies.  Since their 
reasons for rejecting traditional roles are often their perception that their 
individual capability development is suppressed in such roles, we see that 
individual capability development is closely tied to the commitments 
women can make.  Similarly the collective capabilities of women as a social 
group in such instances are closely tied to whether women find themselves 
able to make commitments to social roles available to them.  Alternatively, 
where socially progressive social role opportunities are available to women, 
as in schools and women-led cooperatives, they often are accompanied new 
                                                             
10
 Sen provides a related set of examples in connection with tensions between social roles and 
ethnic or national categorical social identities (Sen 2006). 
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definitions of their categorical social identities as ‘women’ as a result of their 
identification with these groups. 
Notice, however, that this account of individual and collective capabilities is 
still very general, and does not distinguish different domains of social 
interaction.  Since the nature of agency and people’s ability to act – the 
process aspect of capability development – depends on the character of the 
space in which they act, the next section distinguishes three broad domains 
of action – market activity, public deliberation, and community participation 
(Leßmann 2011) – and discusses how they differ in the ways that they 
balance individual and collective capabilities. 
 
6.  Individual and collective capabilities: market activity, public 
deliberation, and community participation 
The general view here is that the social space in which people act determines 
the nature of agency and the determinants of freedom, and that market 
activity, public deliberation, and community participation can be broadly 
distinguished as three different kinds of social space according to 
Granovetter’s social embeddedness understanding of agency and social 
structures.  The approach taken to Granovetter’s framework is to focus on 
individual and collective capabilities.  Since the analysis above of individual 
and collective capabilities is a social group analysis, these three domains of 
social activity are compared in terms of how social groups operate within 
them.  It is not assumed that social interaction in these domains is fully 
reducible to individual-social group relationships, so this discussion only 
partly implements Granovetter’s view.  But it is assumed that social group 
membership is an important part of social interaction, and that individual-
social group relationships are important in all three domains. For example, 
in markets, people belong to firms and households, in the political arena 
where public deliberation occurs people belong to parties, government 
agencies, and alliances, and in community participation people belong to 
community organizations, self-help groups, and tightly knit social 
networks.11  As noted at the outset, the strategy of the analysis is to proceed 
in a sequential manner by first explaining the process aspect of capability 
development and agency in each of these domains and then addressing the 
interaction between the domains.  How, then, do the three domains each 
balance individual and collective capabilities? 
Markets, most would agree, are an undersocialized social domain in which 
individuals’ social embeddedness is relatively limited. Put in terms of the 
influences that individuals and social structures have on one another, the 
                                                             
11 As associated with bonding (as opposed to bridging) social capital in social capital theory. 
J. Davis - Agency and the process aspect of capability development 
 
20 
 
social structures that frame the market process (state regulation and social-
ethical values) tend to promote individual market activity or place modest 
limitations upon it.  In social group terms, firms and households have 
limited hold on individuals who enter and exit them on a regular basis (as 
measured by average number of lifetime employers and average number 
household lifetime partners). The market is a space in which people 
primarily seek to develop individual capabilities, though these are still 
“socially dependent individual capabilities.”  In contrast, firms and 
households are constrained in their ability to develop their ‘individually 
dependent” respective collective capabilities by individual mobility.   When 
we think of their internal organization in terms of role relationships, 
individual opportunities for exit weaken firm and household cohesiveness.  
In terms of Sen’s different aspects of the self thinking, individuals’ 
privateness is high.  In general the market promotes welfarist thinking.  As 
individuals enter and exit firms and households, they may slide back and 
forth between self-centered welfare and self-welfare goal.  Households 
provide a basis for self-goal choice and commitment, but this is always in 
tension with the two narrower aspects of privateness. 
The political arena of public deliberation promotes individual capabilities 
and also many social group collective capabilities, and thus increases the 
weight that collective capabilities play in people’s lives over what we see in 
the market domain.  Individuals’ identification with political groups often 
endures despite many other changes in their lives, and political groups 
(parties, government agencies, and alliances) arguably sustain their 
identities longer than do firms and households, and so more successfully 
develop ‘individually dependent” collective capabilities.  Nonetheless 
individuals also draw on political groups to advance their own “socially 
dependent individual capabilities.”  This implies that the political arena is 
neither a particularly undersocialized nor oversocialized social domain but 
some mixture of both regimes.  In terms of Sen’s different aspects of the self 
thinking, depending on the circumstances, individuals’ privateness ranges 
across the full spectrum of forms.  Individuals use political groups to 
advance self-centered welfare, defend allies for self-welfare goals, formulate 
all sorts of political objectives in self-goal choice terms, and identify with 
parties (in relational and categorical social identity terms) through acts of 
commitment.  Social embeddedness is thus neither low nor high in that 
individuals and social structures both influence one another.   
For the capability approach, that community participation is a social domain 
distinct from both markets and the political realm is reflected in how 
important commitment is in sustaining community organizations, self-help 
groups, and tightly knit social networks.12  Such social groups are often 
                                                             
12 Social capital theory also emphasizes social networks, which include community participation. 
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characterized as ‘third way’ voluntary organizations or social enterprises, 
because they are neither profit-driven nor part of the state (Becchetti and 
Borzaga 2010).  They consequently depend almost entirely on individuals’ 
commitment to them and strong identification with their overall goals and 
the role opportunities they create for members.  That is, their collective 
capabilities are highly ‘individually dependent.’  At the same time, 
individuals exhibit the lowest levels of privateness in Sen’s sense, and their 
individual capabilities are particularly “socially dependent” in being 
especially tied to their roles and relationships in such groups.13  In 
Granovetter’s framework, the domain of community participation is in effect 
oversocialized in the sense that development of collective capabilities has a 
greater weight and social interaction has an especially strong influence on 
individuals.  Indeed, Evans’ view of social groups as engaged in collective 
action captures much of what this domain involves, if not the understanding 
of social groups employed here.  
In light of this, what can we say generally about the process aspect of 
capability development?  In using this term, Sen couples freedom with the 
social space in which people act, and so in principle to analyze it we might 
disaggregate all the way down to individual functionings (Alkire 2005).  The 
focus of the discussion here, however, has been on how we can understand 
agency and freedom when social group membership is important to 
individuals, and so intermediate to examining the process aspect in relation 
to individual functionings, the goal has been to understand it when people 
have different types of relationships to social groups.  The debate in the 
capability approach over individual and collective capabilities has not 
brought out these differences, arguably because of lack of clarity over how 
the idea of a social group ought to be understood in the capability approach.  
Indeed, when social groups are seen as fully integrated, it is difficult to speak 
about the process aspect of individual capability development at all.  Yet 
when we move to the idea of social groups as not fully integrated, we see 
that there are different kinds of social space in which people exercise choice, 
as reflected in the different ways in which individual and collective 
capabilities are related.  Granovetter’s social embeddedness conception is 
helpful here in providing general guidelines for thinking about this 
relationship since it gives us a way of understanding not just how individuals 
are influenced by social interaction but also how social interaction is 
influenced by individuals.  In the account here, that social embeddedness 
explanation combines Sen’s understanding of individuals in his privateness 
framework and an understanding of social interaction in terms of social 
group membership.  The general conclusion is that we need to think of the 
                                                             
13 That is, they are ‘relational capabilities’ (Uyan-Semerci 2007).   
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process aspect of capability development according to how each social 
domain balances individual and collective capabilities. 
 
7.  The process aspect of capability development: Individual and 
collective capabilities 
The process aspect of capability development concerns people’s ability to act 
as agents of their own individual capability development.  It does not 
concern social groups’ ability to engage in collective action as agents of a 
collective capability development.  So it might be objected to any discussion 
of collective capabilities that they are irrelevant to the process aspect of 
individual capability development.  However, such a view presupposes a 
fully integrated view of social groups and a strong individual capabilities-
collective capabilities dichotomy.  On the alternative view of social groups 
advanced using Sen’s ‘privateness’ framework, collective capabilities have a 
dual relation to people’s individual capabilities, and so the process aspect of 
individual capability development makes what collective capabilities people 
are able to pursue together important to what individual capabilities they 
are able to pursue separately.  Note that this is not at odds with the 
capability approach’s ethical individualism as a framework for the evaluation 
of individual advantage (Robeyns, 2005) since the opportunity aspect of the 
capability approach is distinct from its process aspect.  What opportunities 
we judge people to have individually is independent of their abilities to 
pursue those opportunities, which vary according to their social 
circumstances.  That is, the evaluation of individual advantage is a matter 
that is different from the evaluation of agency. 
It might also be objected to the explanation of agency in terms of these 
different social domains that this implies that individual agency is greater in 
market activity where individual capabilities dominate and almost 
unimportant in community participation where collective capabilities 
dominate.  But this is a misconception since there being a greater or lesser 
relative role for collective capability development does not imply anything 
about the extent to which people are agents in the two domains.  In 
particular, it does not imply that people are any less individual agents when 
participating in community; it only implies that collective capabilities play a 
larger role in generating their “socially dependent individual capabilities.”  
To assume otherwise is to say that social interaction and cooperation by 
nature reduce freedom, and that freedom is greatest when individuals have 
limited social interaction in markets.   
What the domain analysis of agency and the process aspect of capability 
development ultimately offer, then, are two things.  On the one hand, it 
Filosofía de la Economía, 2015, Vol. 4, pp. 5-24 
23 
 
provides us one way to be more concrete and specific about the 
circumstances in which people act as agents.  Just as there are many ways in 
which people can develop their opportunities, so there are many ways in 
which they will be more or less free to do so.  On the other hand, it provides 
us a way of thinking more clearly about what collective capabilities are and 
what their relation to individual capabilities is.  In this way it accordingly 
provides a means of making social interaction more central to the capability 
approach. 
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